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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT
CITY, a public entity,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
JUNIATA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT D.
BARROWS, JR.; BEATRICE IRENE
BARROWS; ELLEN K. DASKALAS, an
individual, dba THE PAWN SHOP,
THE PAWN SHOP, a Utah
corporation; JAMES ANDERSON,
AN INDIVIDUAL, dba JIM'S RIBS;
TERRY PANTELAKIS, an
individual, dba AAA JEWELERS
AND LOANS; and LOANS AND SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,

Case No. 870235

Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS BURGE, BARROWS AND BARROWS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to
the provisions

of Sections

3 and

5, Article VIII of the Utah

Constitution; Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953) (1987 Supp.);
and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.
under

Whether under the terms of the written Lease agreements
which

condemned

by

the
these

tenants

were

proceedings,

occupying
the

the

tenants

property

possess

a

being
"bonus

value" as entitles them to share in the proceeds awarded to the
owners as just compensation.
2.

Whether the owners should be awarded attorney's fees

incurred in defending against the tenants7 claims of a bonus value
where the Leases provide that the tenant shall "pay all costs and
attorney's fees and expenses that shall arise from enforcing the
terms and provisions of this Lease."
3.

Whether this matter should be remanded to the District

Court to award additional attorney's fees incurred in defending
against this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The owners held fee simple title to real property and their
total tract was condemned by Plaintiff for redevelopment purposes
leaving no remainder.

At the time the action was filed, the

tenants were in possession at two separate addresses both located
on the total tract.

They were occupying pursuant to two separate

written Lease agreements identical in their terms except for the
address and amount of rent payable.
Both

Leases

contain the

identical

"condemnation clause,"

which provides that in the event the property is condemned the
lease may be terminated at will by either party.

The Leases also

provide that the owners should be awarded attorney's fees if they
are required to enforce the lease provisions.

2

The case was set for jury trial on Monday, February 9, 1987,
on the issue of valuation, but at the pre-trial conference held at
2:30 p.m. on Friday, February 6, 1987, the tenants, attorney,
Brant H. Wall, moved to bifurcate the trial by first having a
separate trial to determine whether the tenants are entitled to
receive compensation for the leasehold interests in the subject
property.

That trial was held on Tuesday, February 10, 1987, at

which the Court heard testimony and received exhibits and other
evidence as to the tenants' rights to share in the award of just
compensation and other issues arising under the terms of their
tenancy.

The Court ruled that the leasehold interests of the

tenants had no "bonus value" for which they should be compensated
and awarded to the owners costs and attorney's fees for defending
against the tenants7 claims for compensation asserted contrary to
the provisions of the Lease.

It is from these rulings that the

tenants herein appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendants, Juniata Irene Burge, Robert D. Barrows, Jr.
(aka Robert G. Barrows) and Beatrice Irene Barrows (hereinafter
collectively referred to the "owners") were the owners of real
property located at 62, 64, and 66 East 200 South (hereinafter the
"property") in Salt Lake City, Utah.
action

were

joined

because

they

The other Defendants in this
were

tenants

occupying

the

property at the time of commencement of this action under written
3

Lease agreements identical in all material respects except for the
Defendant Anderson who occupied the basement at 62 East 2 00 South
on a month-to-month tenancy pursuant to an oral lease. 1

The main

floors at 62 East 200 South were occupied by the Defendant, Loans
and Sales, Inc., whose written Lease expired on May 31, 1985, and
at the time of the commencement of this action it occupied on a
month-to-month tenancy which it terminated shortly following the
filing of this action.

It claims no interest in these proceedings

and failed to appear or be represented at trial and was dismissed
from these proceedings.2
and participated

The Defendant Anderson was represented

at all the proceedings, but was

found by the

Court to have no interest or right to share in an award of just
compensation

for

any

leasehold

interest, and

Anderson

has

not

appealed that decision and is not a party to these proceedings on
appeal.
The Defendants/Appellants, Ellen K. Daskalas, The Pawn Shop
and Terry Pantelakis (hereinafter collectively referred to as the
"tenants") ,

are

the

only

tenants

appealing.,

They

were

in

possession of two separate premises at the time the action was
filed, both located on the total tract, pursuant to two separate
written Lease agreements identical in their terms except for the
address and amount of rent payable.
1

R.538 (paragraph 2 ) .

2

R.546 (paragraph 1 ) .
4

The Lease with Pantelakis for

the premises at 64 East 200 South is attached to the Addendum as
Exhibit "A" and the Lease to Daskalas and The Pawn Shop for the
premises at 66 East 200 South is attached to the Addendum as
Exhibit "B," both being made a part of this Brief.

These separate

written Leases (hereinafter "Leases") were both entered into on or
about August 1, 1981, and are for a term of five years with an
option to renew for an additional five years.

The occupancy and

possession by the tenants continued to run uninterrupted to the
date of entry of the final Order of Condemnation on June 8, 1987.3
The pertinent parts of the Leases provide as follows:
In the event said premises, or any part
thereof, or the whole or any part of the said
building shall be taken by right of eminent
domain . . . after the execution and before
the termination hereof, this lease may, at the
election of Lessor or Lessee be terminated;
provided, however, in such event, Lessee shall
be entitled to such compensation for
improvements made to said premises, in an
amount equal to the compensation received by
Lessor in respect thereof and as a result
thereof, regardless of the termination of this
Lease. (p. 4)
No holding over by Lessee, however long
continued, shall operate to renew or extend
this Lease without Lessor's written consent.
If Lessee holds possession of said premises
after the term of this Lease or any renewal
term thereof, Lessee shall become a tenant
from month to month, at the rent payable in
the last installment during the last month of
the term of this Lease, and upon the terms
herein specified, and shall continue to be
such tenant until the tenancy shall be
3

R.827.
5

terminated by Lessor or until Lessee shall
have given Lessor a written notice of at least
one
(1) month of Lessee's intention to
terminate the tenancy. (p. 5)
. . . Lessee also agrees to pay all costs and
attorney's fees and expenses that shall arise
from enforcing the terms and provisions of
this Lease. (p.6)
Lessor grants to Lessee an option to renew
this Lease for a period of five (5) years
after the expiration of the term of this Lease
at a rental to be negotiated at least sixty
(60) days prior to the expiration of this
Lease, with all other terms and conditions of
the renewal Lease to be the same as those
herein. To exercise this option, Lessee must
give Lessor written notice of intention to
extend at least ninety (90) days before this
Lease expires. (p. 8)
The

property

is

located

on

Block

57

and

the

Plaintiff,

Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, brought this action on
June

24,

1985,

to

redevelopment

plans

tenants,

and

by

condemn
for

through

the

the

total

block. 4

their

tract
On

attorney,

as

July

part
31,

Jerome

of

its

1985,

the

H.

Mooney,

stipulated with the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff has the power of
eminent domain and right to immediate occupancy.5

The tenants

entered into the Stipulation based upon an agreement they had to
lease the property back from the Plaintiff6 so the tenants could
4

R.2-7.

5

R.71-75.

6

R.243-244, 258 (paragraph 2 ) .

6

remain in possession longer.7

The owners would not stipulate to

Plaintiff's occupancy so the Plaintiff filed its Motion for Order
of Immediate Occupancy on August 1, 1985. 8

The Motion was opposed

by the owners, as set forth in their Answer to Motion for Order of
Immediate Occupancy, Motion and Notice filed on August 6, 1985, 9
denying Plaintiff's power of eminent domain or need for immediate
occupancy and moving the Court to find that the tenants have no
right or claim to any award of just compensation.
The Motions of the Plaintiff and owners were both noticed for
hearing on August 13, 1985. 1 0

The owners' Motion and Notice were

personally served upon the tenants in a timely manner by being
hand-carried by the owners' attorney, John T. Evans, to the office
of the tenants' attorney, Jerome H. Mooney. 11
At the hearing on August
attorneys

13, 1985, the tenants and their

failed to appear and the Plaintiff, owners and those

neighbors who also owned land on Block 57 stipulated to the entry
7

The Trial Court concluded that had the Lease not
terminated upon the filing of the action, it would have
terminated when the tenants entered into this new lease
agreement with the Plaintiff, which constituted an
election by the tenants to terminate their Leases with
the owners. R.538 (paragraph 3 ) .

8

R.38-40.

9

R.218-225.

10

R.224.

11

R.251-253.
7

of the Order of Immediate Occupancy, which Order incorporated the
provisions of the owners' Motion by ordering that the

"tenants

have no right or claim to the proceeds to be awarded

in this

action as just compensation and that all sums paid pursuant to
this

Order

of Immediate Occupancy

and by virtue

of the

final

Judgment of Just Compensation shall be the sole property off and
are to be paid directly to the Owner-Defendants, to-wit:

Juniata

Irene Burge, Robert G. Barrows and Beatrice Irene Barrows, without
notice to or approval by the Tenant-Defendants."12

The Order was

signed by the Court and entered on August 16, 1985.
The tenants7

attorney, Jerome Mooney,

filed on August 23,

1985, his Objection to that portion of the Order of

Immediate

Occupancy, 13 arguing that the day he was served was the first day
his office was open at its new location, implying that the Motion
and Notice were not brought to his attention.

Mr. Mooney does

acknowledge, however, that he was aware of the hearing on August
13,

1985,

and

did

have

possession

of

the

owners 7

Answer

to

Complaint, which was hand-delivered to his office at the same time
as the Answer to Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy, Motion
and

Noticee 14

Arguing

lack of notice, the

12

R.238-239 (Paragraph 3 ) .

13

R.243-244.

14

R.257-260.

8

tenants

filed,

on

August

23, 1985, their Objection to Order lb

asserting

a right

under the Lease agreements to share in the proceeds to be awarded.
The owners then filed their Motion for Summary Judgment and Notice
on

October

25, 1985, seeking

an Order

of the Court that

the

tenants had no right to the proceeds and asking that the Court
award attorney's fees to the owners for being required to enforce
the condemnation clause of the Leases. 16
Such Motion and Objection were brought on for hearing before
the Court on November
either matter. 17

1, 1985, but the Court did not rule on

Tenants' Objection to the Order, however, was

not based on the fact that the Order did not accurately reflect
the ruling of the Court, and such Order of Immediate Occupancy has
continued to remain in full force and effect and provides that
possession of the property will be immediately relinquished by the
owners at such time as they withdraw any portion of the funds
deposited by Plaintiff with the Clerk of the Court. 18

At the

conclusion of the hearing, therefor, the tenants asked the Court
to freeze such funds until the rights of the tenants thereto can
be determined and the Court did order that such funds be frozen
and not be distributed
15

R.243-244.

16

R.272-284.

17

R.302.

18

R.237-238.

to any of the Defendants until

9

further

order, thereby denying the owners the right to withdraw such funds
or any portion thereof. 19
Trial was set for February 9, 1987, to determine the value of
the

property

conference

and

held

continuance

the

interests

on February

of that trial

6,

therein, but

at

the

pre-trial

1987, the tenants moved

and asked

for a

the Court to first set a

separate trial to hear evidence and make its determination as to
those

issues

Objection

to

tenants. 20

raised
Order

in

the

Motion

concerning

Accordingly,

the

for

Summary

rights

the matter

was

and

Judgment
duties

brought

on

and

of

for

the

trial

before the Court sitting without a jury on February 10, 1987, at
which time the Court heard the testimony of witnesses and other
evidence,

including

introduction

of exhibits, proffers

and the

arguments of counsel for the Plaintiff, the owners and th€> tenants
as

to

the

tenants7

rights

to

share

in

the

award

of

just

compensation

and other issues arising under the terms of their

tenancy. 21

Following

the

tenants have no compensable

trial,

the

leasehold

Court
interest

ordered

that

the

in the property

other than a claim for improvements made to the premises, if any.
19

R.551.

20

The tenants wanted the trial bifurcated so they would
not have to go to the expense of participating in a
three-day trial. No proffer was ever introduced by
the tenants as to what their evidence would show
concerning the amount of any bonus value, if any.

21

R.533.
10

The Court further ordered that the owners7 pleadings are amended
to conform to the evidence and granted the owners' Motion for an
award of attorney's fees and expenses, pursuant to the attorney's
fee provision of the Leases.22
Subsequent

to

this

ruling,

a

three-day

trial

was

then

conducted beginning February 23, 1987, as to the issue of the
value of the property sought to be condemned and the improvements
thereon and of each interest therein.

The tenants failed to

appear at trial and at no time made any proffer as to what their
evidence would show as to the amount of any improvements or bonus
value to which they would be entitled under the Leases.
Subsequent to the trial, a hearing was held on March 25,
1987,

to

attorney's

rule

on

various

motions,

including

the

fees that should be awarded the owners.

amount

of

At that

hearing, evidence was admitted as to the amount of time which had
been incurred by the owners' attorney

in connection with the

tenants' claim, the necessity of incurring those hours and the
reasonableness of the amount of the fees incurred.

This evidence

was set forth in the owners' Affidavit in Support of Attorney's
Fees

From

Tenants 23

which

was

admitted

into

evidence

by

Stipulation of the parties, subject to Mr. Wall's right of cross22

R.546-548. The amount of such fee was not determined
by the Court until the hearing on May 28, 1987, at
which time the Court ordered payment of $9,000.00.

23

R.456-466.
11

examination and without prejudice to his argument that attorney's
fees should not be awarded. 24

At the hearing the Court authorized

the owners to submit an additional Affidavit regarding attorney's
fees and ruled that the tenants could have a further hearing on
the matter to present evidence as to the issue of attorney's fees
and to afford the tenants their right of cross-examination.25

On

April 6, 1987, the owners submitted their Supplemental Affidavit
in Support of Attorney's Fees From Tenants primarily summarizing
the

"record" 26

following

which

Mr.

Wall

set

evidentiary hearing to be held on May 28, 1987.

the

matter

for

At that time, Mr.

Wall filed his Affidavit, 27 but no further evidence was introduced
and no cross-examination of the tenants' attorney was sought.

The

matter

the

was

argued

and

submitted

on

the

Affidavits.

At

conclusion of that hearing, the Court awarded the sum of $9,000.00
attorney's fees to be paid by the tenants, as noted above, and
inserted that amount as part of the Order and Judgment, which was
then entered. 28
Regarding the funds on deposit with the Clerk, the tenants
filed a Motion after the Court ordered that the tenants had no
24

R.767-768.

25

R.501.

26

R.502-506.

27

R.524-527.

28

R.546-548.
12

right to the compensation to be paid

for the taking of the

property, seeking an order of the Court releasing its freeze on
the funds so they could then be paid to the owners.29

That issue

was also brought on for hearing before the Trial Court on March
25, 1987. The Court denied that Motion, ordering instead that the
funds be returned to the Plaintiff.30

At that time, the tenants

were still occupying the property and making their rent payments
to the owners, as provided under the Lease Agreements.31

The

Court ordered that the tenants continue to pay their rent payments
directly to the owners until the Redevelopment Agency obtained
possession of the property,32 which occurred on June 8, 1987, when
the Plaintiff filed its Final Order of Condemnation.33

In other

words, during all the proceedings from the time of the filing of
this action to the date the owners lost all interest in the
property, the tenants remained in undisturbed possession of their
premises at the same contract rents provided for in the Lease
agreements.
29

R.476-479.

30

R.552 (Paragraph 6).

31

TR. (R.827).

32

R.550 (Paragraph 4).

33

R.560-562.

13

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case was set for jury trial on February 9, 1987, to
determine the issue as to the value of the property, including
improvements thereon, and of each interest therein.

The tenants

would have had an opportunity to present evidence and testimony as
to the extent of damages and right to participate in any award
made by the jury.

The tenants waived that right when, at the pre-

trial conference on February 6, 1987, they moved for a continuance
of the trial and asked the Court to first rule at a preliminary
trial as to whether the tenant had any compensable intercut under
the Leases.

It was the tenants' intent and purpose to avoid going

to trial on the issue of how much their compensable interest would
be and at no time did the tenants make any proffer as to what
their evidence would show as to the amount of such value, if any.
The tenants were not prejudiced by not participating in the
trial to determine the value of property interests where they had
no bonus value under the Lease.

The tenants were granted a trial

as to the issue of whether they had a right to share in the award
of just compensation and other issues arising under the terms of
their

tenancy, at which they were given

full opportunity

to

present witnesses and other evidence and argue the matter before
the Court.
The Trial Court correctly

found that the tenants had no

compensable interest under the Lease Agreements because either the
14

Leases terminated at the time of filing of this action, or, if
they did not terminate, the tenants under the lease provisions had
no greater leasehold rights than that of a month-to-month tenant
and, in any event, suffered no damages prior to the date of
termination because they were allowed to remain in possession for
the same rents.
The attorney's fee provisions of the Leases are controlling.
The Trial Court's award was substantiated by the evidence, and
there were no procedural defects.

Also, additional attorney's

fees should be awarded to the owners under the provisions of the
Leases for defending against this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
TENANTS HAD FULL OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
AT TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THEY HAD A
COMPENSABLE LEASEHOLD INTEREST AND THE
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THEY
HAD NO RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY AWARD
As a general rule, a tenant, losing its leasehold interest in
property due to a condemnation proceeding, is entitled to be
compensated if its lease has what is sometimes referred to as a
"bonus value,"

that value being the difference between present

worth of the market value of the unexpired term of the lease and
the present value of the rents required to be paid under the

15

lease.34

Both Leases in question contain a condemnation clause

known as an "optional termination clause," which provides that in
the event the property is condemned the lease may be terminated at
will by either party.35

The real question before this Court is

whether a lease with such a provision gives the tenants a "bonus
value" such as will allow them to share in the owners' award of
just compensation.

The Trial Court ruled that the condemnation

clause in the lease precludes the tenants from having a bonus
value and the tenants are appealing that ruling.36
The tenants argue that the lease did not terminate until
January 31, 1987,37 which was after they gave notice to the owners
of the tenants' intention to renew the Lease,38 and had they been
afforded the right to trial they could have proven a bonus value
during that period.

It is the owners position that

(A) the

tenants were given a full and fair trial on the issue of whether
34

State Road Commission v. Brown, 531 P.2d 1294, 1285 (Utah
1975).

35

Page 4 of Leases.

36

The condemnation clause also allowed the tenants to be
reimbursed for improvements made to the property, if any,
that is not an issue in this appeal inasmuch as the Trial
Court allowed the tenants to present such evidence, but
the tenants waived that right, concluding they had no
valid claim to any improvements on the premises.
(Conclusions of Law, Page 8, Paragraph 5).

37

Brief of Appellants, Page 9.

38

Brief of Appellants, Page 8.
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the tenants had any bonus value under their Leases; (B) the Trial
Court properly ruled that the Leases had no such bonus value;
therefore, (C) the tenants were not entitled to a trial as to what
the amount of any such bonus value would be.
A.
THE TENANTS RECEIVED A FULL AND FAIR TRIAL AS
TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THERE WAS ANY BONUS
VALUE UNDER THE LEASES
The tenants seem to question whether they received a fair
hearing as to the issue of whether there was a bonus value under
the Leases39

Upon the tenants motion, the Trial Court granted a

special trial setting to determine that issue that was held on
February 10, 1987,40 at which the parties were present, together
with other witnesses.

It was not simply a hearing on a Motion for

Summary Judgment submitted on Affidavit, but testimony was taken,
proffers

were

made

and

exhibits

were

introduced

concerning

interpretation of the Lease provisions, whether there was an
extension
received

of the
and

original

whether

its

term

of the Lease, what rent was

receipt

was

evidence

of

such

an

39

The tenants state that their first issue presented for
review is, "whether or not the Trial Court erred in
ruling, as a matter of law, that the filing of the
condemnation action by the Plaintiff served to terminate
the leasehold interests of the tenants, and thus deprive
the tenants of the right to a full evidentiary trial
on the issue of damages and just compensation." (Brief
of Appellants, Page 3).

40

TR. (R. 625-743).
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extension, and what notices of election to terminate were given.4i
The Trial Court then entered its Conclusions of Law 42 and Order
and Judgment,43 correctly ruling that the tenants had no bonus
value under the Leases.

The tenants were not denied a trial to

present evidence as to bonus value as alleged.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT NO BONUS VALUE
EXISTED UNDER THE LEASES
The tenants were not entitled to share in any award of just
compensation because (1) the taking of an entire tract or parcel
terminates a tenants interest under a lease with an "optional
termination

clause;

(2)

a

leasehold

interest

which

can

be

terminated by the lessor at will has no bonus value; and (3) the
See page 2 of tenants7 Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion for Summary Disposition on file herein dated
August 7, 1987.
3. The provisions under the Daskalas and Pantelakis
Leases are controlling and such Leases terminated as
of the commencement of this action against the
Defendants and, in any event, would have terminated
upon tenants' agreement with the Plaintiff to enter
into a new lease arrangement, or upon the owners'
filing of their Motion for Summary Judgment, or upon
the service upon the tenants of the owners' election
of termination. (R.538).
2. The tenants, Anderson, Daskalas and Pantelakis
shall not receive compensation or share in an award
herein of just compensation for any leasehold interest
in the subject property, but may present evidence at
the trial of just compensation as to the amount the
tenants would be entitled to receive for improvements
made to the premises, if any. (R.546).
18

tenants are not entitled to compensation where the election to
terminate has been made, especially while remaining in possession
prior to actual termination of the lease.
1.
courts

Optional termination clauses are commonly upheld by the
and

assertion. 44
applies,

no

ambiguity
The need

however,

condemnation

found

to make

when

because

is

its

there

an election

has

purpose

contrary

been
is

to

a

to

the

tenants

to terminate
partial

determine

remainder parcel will continue to be leased.

taking
whether

only
in
the

The courts have

held, therefore, that in the event of a total taking of property,
the filing of an election to terminate becomes moot and "has no
meaning

whatever,

since

there

is

nothing

to

'opt'

for." 45

Goodyear Shoe Machinery Co. v. Boston Terminal Co., 4 6 interpreted
an optional termination clause where there was a partial taking.
The Court noted that had there been a total take the tenants'
rights would have terminated without an election:
We are of the opinion that the judgment
appealed from was right. Of course, any valid
taking of the whole premises would put an end
to the lease . . . and therefore the provision
quoted must not be construed too liberally in
its application to the present case.
The
44

96 ALR2d 1140, 1155.

45

Beherer Holding Corp. v. State, 26 Misc 2d 388, 209 NYS
2d 899, 903 (1961). See also, In Re Improvement of
Third Street, 178 Minn 552, 228 N.W. 162 (1929); 96
ALR2d 1140 at 1160 (Section ll[b]).

46

176 Mass 115, 57 N.E. 214, (1900).
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object is that which is pointed out in Munigle
v. City of Boston, 3 Allen, 230, 232, and the
meaning is that the landlord can terminate the
right of the tenant to share in the damages, •
. . Probably, if the clause had not dealt with
the taking of a part as well as of the whole,
and had referred only to a taking of the
whole, it would have stipulated absolutely
that the tenant's rights should end without
requiring an election by the landlord.
The
election is inserted with reference to a
partial taking.
In this case, the election
was sufficiently manifested by the notice.
Id. at 215.
The condemnation of the subject property constitutes a total
taking of all the property subject to the Leases.

There is no

remainder parcel that will be available to the tenants following
these proceedings, hence no formal election of termination is
necessary, the tenants lease term terminated upon the filing of
the court action and the tenants have no bonus value.
2.

Even if the Leases were not terminated by the filing of

the action, there would still be no bonus value because the lessor
could at any time elect to terminate the Lease without cause, and
when such election is made, the tenants would have no right to
remain on the property longer than one month.47
tenants would have would be a month-to-month
because of
interest

The most the

tenancy, which,

its short term nature, is not such an €>state or
in

condemned

property

Lease, Paragraph 5.

as

entitles

the

tenant

to

compensation. 48

Possession could even be terminated sooner if the

Plaintiff

possession

took

pursuant

to

the

Court's

Order

of

Immediate Occupancy, which possession had already been agreed to
by

the

tenants

as

set

forth

in their

Stipulation

Defendants for Order of Immediate Occupancy. 49

of Tenant-

A lease which can

be terminated at will and without cause has no bonus value.
3.
is

Cases uniformly hold that, when an option to terminate

exercised

by

the

lessor

under

the

"optional

termination

clauses" of a lease, such election bars the tenants from sharing
in the award of just compensation:
Where a lease, under which the tenant holds,
provides that the lessor has the option of
terminating the lease in the event the
property is subsequently taken by eminent
domain proceedings, and it further appears
that the lessor has given such notice of his
intention to terminate as may be required by
the particular Lease, it has been held that
the lessor by exercising his option to
terminate bars the lessee from sharing in the
damages awarded for the condemnation of the
property.
96 ALR2d 1140, 1155, citing
Strazzulla Bros. Co. v. Fargo Real Estate
Trust. 152 F2d 61 (1945) CA Mass); United
States v. 3.5 Acres of Land, 57 F.Supp 548
(1944, DC Mass); Sparrow Chisholm Co. v.
Boston, 327 Mass 64 97 N.E. 2d 172 (1951);
State v. Sheets, 48 Wash 2d 65, 290 P.2d 974
(1955).

48

"A tenant from month-to-month, it has been held, has no
such interest as entitles him to compensation."
2 Nichols, Law of Eminent Domain, Section 5.06[4] nt.
67 at p. 5-129 (Rel. 31-11/82 Pub. 460).

49

R.71-75.
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The Trial Court found that even had the commencement of the
action not terminated
still

taken place.

Plaintiff

to

the Leases, an election to terminate had
It occurred

enter

into a new

"upon tenants' agreement with
lease arrangement,

or upon

the

owners filing of their Motion for Summary Judgment, or upon the
service

upon

the

tenants

of

owners 7

the

Election

of

Termination." 50
Election
commenced.

by

the

tenants

occurred

at

the

time

the

action

On July 30, 1985, the tenants acknowledged acceptance

of service 51 and the very next day entered into a Stipulation with
the Plaintiff agreeing that the Plaintiff had the right to possess
the property 52 and entered into an agreement to lease the property
back from the Plaintiff. 53
enter

There is no way that the tenants could

into such an agreement without having taken the position

that their lease with the owners was terminated.
Election by the owners was made known on August 6, 1985, when
the owners filed their Answer to Motion for Order of Immediate
Occupancy,

Motion

and

Notice

seeking

a

Court

Order

that

the

tenants have no right or claim to the proceeds to be awarded in
50

R.538.

51

R.34-35.

52

R.71-75.

53

R.243-244, 258.
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this action,b4 and the Court so ordered in its Order of Immediate
Occupancy.55

Following the Objection thereto by the tenants, the

owners filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on October 25,
1985, again seeking further Order that the tenants had no right to
compensation under the Lease Agreements.

Then, if that was not

enough to put the tenants on notice that they had no bonus value
under the Leases, the owners filed with the Court a formal Notice
of Election confirming the termination of the Leases, which Notice
was served upon the tenants and their attorneys on or about
February 2, 1987, and was introduced, together with the cover
letter to Mr. Mooney, into evidence as Exhibit 8 at the trial on
February 10, 1987 56 (a copy of which Exhibit is attached hereto as
Exhibit "C" and made a part hereof).

As the tenants admit, there

is absolutely no question that after January 31, 1987, the Leases
were terminated and the tenants were barred from sharing in the
award for the condemnation, and prior to that time the tenants
remained in possession anyway under the old rents as discussed
below.

c.
TENANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A TRIAL AS TO
THE AMOUNT OF BONUS VALUE

54

R.223.

55

R.238.

56

Brief of Appellants, p. 6; R.693-709.
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The

tenants7

argument

seems

to

be

that

an

optional

termination clause is not self-executing at the time an action is
filed

even where there

is a taking of the total tract and,

therefore, the owners are entitled to whatever bonus value existed
from that filing until the tenants served their formal Election of
Termination, and they should have been allowed to present evidence
as to that value at trial.

The tenants were not entitled to such

a trial, however, for the following reasons:
1.

As noted above a lease that has an optional

termination

clause has no bonus value where there is a total taking or either
party made an election to terminate.

But, even if there were a

bonus value, the tenants have no cause to complain, because they
have already received the benefit by continuing in possession well
beyond the time the formal Election of Termination was served by
the owners.57 In other words, even if the economic or market value
rent were greater than the rent provided for in the Leases, the
tenants remained in possession of the property under the same
lease or contract rent and, therefore, received the
any such bonus value.

benefit of

This principle is stated as follows:

Where, prior to entry of judgment in the
condemnation proceeding, lessee enjoys the
balance of the demised term without being
interfered with in any way by the condemnor,
he is not entitled to share in the
condemnation award made to the owners of the
land. Similarly, where the lessee alleging a
57

Brief of Appellants, p. 8.
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de facto taking could have remained on the
property, but did58not, he did not suffer any
compensable loss.
The Plaintiff admits that the right to a bonus value does not
extend beyond the time the election is made.59

Even under the

tenants7 theory of the case, therefor, they have already received
everything they were entitled to by way of bonus value by being
allowed

to

remain

in

possession

until

after

the

Notice

of

Election, so the tenants were not prejudiced by their failure to
present evidence as to the amount of the bonus value.
2.

Any failure of the tenants to have a trial as to the

amount of bonus value was due to their own voluntary waiver of
their participation.

The case was set for trial on February 9,

1987, as to all issues regarding the value of the property and
interests therein, at which all parties were to attend and present
evidence.

But the tenants moved to bifurcate that trial and have

the Court first determine the rights of the tenants.

They did not

want to sit through a three-day valuation trial if the

Court were

going to rule anyway that they had no compensable interest.

They

made no proffer as to what their evidence would show and did not
really want such a trial.
58

Nichols, Law of Eminent Domain, Section 12.42[1] at
p. 12-775 (Rel. No. 21-11/77).

59

"Where an 'optional termination clause7 exists, the right
to share in just compensation exists until an 'election7
is made terminating the lease." Brief of Appellants,
p. 12.
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The Court's ruling against the tenants was not a final order
from which they can appeal, and by failing to appear at the
valuation trial or to make any proffer as to what their evidence
would have shown as to whether they were damaged, they waived
their right to now claim prejudice that they were not given an
opportunity to be heard.

Had they wanted to present evidence as

to valuation, they had the opportunity to do so and should not
have asked for the bifurcation, or at least should have made a
proffer.
3.
value.

Giving notice to extend the lease does not create bonus
The tenants make a number of statements in their Brief

about having given notice of intention to renew the lease and
thereby extend the term thereof.

Evidence of an extension was not

clear and the Trial Court made no ruling as to whether there was
an extension.60

At the trial, the tenants proffered that timely

notices of extension were served, but the tenants denied having
received such notices.61
Even had notice been given, however, it would not have caused
renewal of the lease because the lease had already been terminated
pursuant to the condemnation clause, as discussed above and there
was nothing to renew.

There was no renegotiation as to new lease

payments under a renewal lease, as was required to be done at
60

R.550 (Paragraph 2).

61

R.721-724.
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least sixty days prior to expiration of the old lease. 62

There

can be no contract agreement until the new rental price is agreed
to.

There was no writing evidencing the renewal of a lease and no

renewal can occur without the lessor's written consent. 63
Receipt of the rent by the owners after termination of the
Lease was not acquiescence by the owners of renewal.

Rents were

received pursuant to the paragraph on page 5 of the Lease, under
which the tenants remain in possession on a month-to-month basis
after the Lease terminates.

Tenants understood

this, or they

would not have remained in possession and continued to pay rents
after the date they acknowledge receiving Notice of Termination on
or about January

31, 1987, nor after the Trial Court ruled on

February 10, 1987, that the Leases had terminated.

Staying in

possession does not imply they had a legal right to remain in
possession.
position

The cases cited by the tenants in support of their

that

constituted

the

conduct

of

the

owners

in

accepting

rents

an extension of the Leases are not helpful because

they do not involve the interpretation of Leases resembling in any
way

the

subject

Leases.

Ochsner

v.

Langendorf 64

allowed

an

extension of an oral lease of agricultural property on which crops
62

Page 8 of Leases.

63

Page 5 of Leases.

64

175 P.2d 392 (Colo. 1946).
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Standards Parts' Co. v. D. & J, Investment Co. O D

were planted.
allowed

an

extension

provision

as

exercised

and

to

how

the

because
or when

tenant

the
the

had

written
option

built

a

lease

to

contained

extend

large

was

building

to
on

no
be
the

premises.
Even

had

there

been

a

lease

properly

renewed

and

renegotiated, it would not have created any bonus value because
the new lease payments would have been renegotiated for the full
fair market rent and, hence, there would be no difference between
the economic rent and the contract (lease) amounts and any renewal
lease would still have the same condemnation clause and be subject
to termination at will by the lessor, 66 hence, a renewal lease
would give no greater bonus value to the original lease no matter
what

the

term

of

renewal.

Also, placing

any

value

upon

an

extension of the Lease would be in violation of Section 78-34-11,
Utah Code Ann. (1953), which provides that, "No improvements put
upon the property subsequent to the date of service of summons
shall be included in the assessment of compensation or damages."
The tenants could not seek a greater award due to improving its
position through some action or conduct subsequent to the date of
take.

65

288 P.2d 369 (Okla. 1955).

66

Page 8 of Leases.
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In conclusion, the Lease by its terms has no value to the
tenants in the event of condemnation.

When they signed the Lease,

the tenants agreed that, in the event of an eminent domain action,
the Lease could be terminated at will and without cause by either
party simply by the act of electing to do so, and such election
bars the tenants from sharing in the compensation.
the

Lease

was

not

terminated

until

the

formal

Even assuming
Election

of

Termination was served by the owners dated January 31, 1987, that
election was made in a timely manner in full compliance with the
Lease while the tenants were still enjoying possession under the
same rents.

The leasehold interest had no value.

Even if the tenants were entitled to compensation during the
thirteen months that remained under the lease term after the date
of taking, the tenants were not damaged during that period.

They

continued to have the same possession and use of the premises
without interruption at the same rents provided for in the Leases.
If there were a bonus value before termination, the tenants have
received the benefit of it.
In fact, however, the Lease had no value as of the date of
take because it could be terminated at will by either party.

If

the tenants on that date had tried to sell that Lease to a
knowledgeable buyer based on an alleged bonus value, they would
have found no takers, because it could be terminated instantly
with no remedy to the tenant.

The tenants, therefore, have waived
29

any right to share in an award of compensation to be paid under
the condemnation laws of this State.
POINT II
THE OWNERS ARE ENTITLED TO ALL COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND EXPENSES ARISING FROM ENFORCING THE
CONDEMNATION CLAUSE IN THE LEASES
The award of attorney's fees provided for in a lease depends
upon the particular language used.67

The language of the Leases

under which the owners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees
provides as follows:
It is hereby agreed that if Lessee shall
default in making any or all rental payments,
keeping any or all terms, conditions or
covenants of this Lease, abandon said
premises, become bankrupt or make an
assignment for the benefit of creditors, then
and in any of said cases, Lessor may, after
five (5) days written notice allowing Lessee
to cure any such default, re-enter upon said
premises and, at Lessor's option, annul and
make void this Lease as to all future rights
of Lessee, anything herein to the contrary
notwithstanding. Lessee covenants and agrees
that in case of termination accomplished
pursuant to provisions of this paragraph,
Lessee will indemnify Lessor against all loss
of rents or other payments which, but for such
termination, Lessor would have been entitled
to receive under the terms and provisions of
this Lease, and also against all attorney's
"It is not uncommon now for parties to a lease to make
provisions for the allowance of attorneys' fees. Such
provisions are not uniform as respects details. It is
obvious that the right of a lessor or lessee to recover
such fees involves the construction of the particular
language used, in the light of the facts and
circumstances appearing." 49 Am Jur 2d, Landlord and
Tenant, Section 189 at 212.
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fees and expenses incurred by Lessor in
enforcing any of the terms and provisions of
this Lease.6^ (Emphasis added.)
Lessee also agrees to pay all costs and
attorney's fees and expenses that shall arise
from enforcing the terms and provisions of
this Lease.69
The tenants argue that if the Leases terminated, then the
attorney's

fee

provisions

are

no

longer binding

between the

parties, but it can be seen that this argument is specifically
anticipated by the Leases in providing that the tenants have a
duty to pay attorney's fees to the owners even if the owners
"annul and make void this Lease."

In this matter, however, the

contract was not void and did not cease to exist as alleged by the
tenants.

Even when the five-year term of the Lease terminated at

the time of the filing of this action, as determined by the Trial
Court,

a

landlord/tenant

relationship

continued

parties, which was governed by the Leases.

between

the

The Lease agreements

did not terminate, only the right to remain in possession the full
five years terminated.

The tenants remained in possession on a

month-to-month tenancy still subject to the same Leases, which, of
course, still included the same condemnation clause and attorney's
fee provisions.

This is provided in the Leases as follows:

No holding over by lessee, however long
continued, shall operate to renew or extend
68

Page 5 of Leases.

69

Page 6 of Leases.
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this Lease without Lessor's written consent.
If Lessee holds possession of said premises
after the term of this Lease or any renewal
term thereof, Lessee shall become a tenant
from month to month, at the rent payable in
the last installment during the last month of
the term of this Lease, and upon the terms
herein specified, and shall continue to be
such tenant until the tenancy shall be
terminated by Lessor or until Lessee shall
have given Lessor a written notice of at least
one
(1) month of Lessee's intention to
terminate the tenancy. 70
Attorney's

fees

can be

recovered

in accordance with

such

provision in a written lease, even if the lease has terminated. 71
BLT Inv. Co. v. Snow, 72 cited by the tenants in support of their
position that fees cannot be awarded after termination is not in
point.

As

explained,

the

Leases

before

this

Court

remained

binding agreements governing the contractual relationship of the
parties, even after the tenants' rights to the full five-year term
were terminated.

However, in BLT Inv. Co. v. Snow, supra. , the

Court found there never had been a contract between the parties.
A

written

contract

had

been

executed

which

omitted

important

escrow provisions, without which the seller refused to perform.
The Trial Court was affirmed in finding that the contract was not
complete
rescinded

without
the

those

executed

escrow

provisions

document

holding,

and,
in

therefore,

effect,

that

70

Page 5 of Leases.

71

Petersen v. Hodges. 121 Utah 72, 239 P.2d 180 (1951).

72

586 P.2d 456 (Utah 1972).

it
the

contract of the parties was never finalized and, therefore, never
came into effect.

The partial agreement was not "terminated."

It

was rescinded and voided as though it never came into existence.
BLT Inv. Co. , supra., did not involved a binding agreement which
had governed the relationship of the parties for four years before
the filing of a condemnation action and continued thereafter to
govern the contractual relationship of the parties, including its
provisions for attorney's fees, as is the case with our Leases.
The tenants argue that attorney's fees cannot be awarded
because the owners failed to comply with Rules 13(f) and 15(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in that the owners failed to file a
cross-claim and the tenants did not consent to amendment of the
pleadings to conform to the evidence regarding attorney's fees.
Rule 13(f), however, clarifies what claims may be stated in a
cross-claim.

It does not preclude the determination of such

claims where there is compliance with Rule 15(b).

The tenants'

consent to amendment of the pleadings is not a requirement of Rule
15(b), contrary to Plaintiff's assertion.

Rule 15(b) has a second

part to it which allows the Court to amend the pleadings when the
parties do not consent.

This was explained in General Insurance

Company of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp.,73 cited in the
tenants'

Brief,

which

the

Court

cited

explanation in Moore's Federal Practice:
73

545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976).
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with

approval

the

The treatise by Moore explains that an
amendment to conform to evidence may be made
at any time on motion of any party.
The
parties may, by express consent, or by the
introduction of evidence without objection,
amend the pleadings at will. During the trial
if a party expressly requests leave to amend
to conform pleadings to the proof adduced and
to reflect issues raised by either express or
implied
consent, such
leave should
be
granted. 74
The first part of Rule 15(b) should be
contrasted with the second part where an
amendment is offered during trial in response
to an objection to evidence. In such a case,
the standards set forth in the second part of
Rule 15(b) will apply, viz., leave may be
granted in the absence of prejudice, undue
delay, or laches. 7 ^
The General Insurance case, supra, is not in point because it
involves the first part of Rule 15(b), where the evidence upon
which a party based

its motion to amend was introduced without

objection, and thus, the issue was tried by implied consent.

In

our case, the owners7 evidence as to attorney's fees was objected
to by the tenants as raising an issue not founded upon a proper
pleading.

Over the tenants' objections, the Trial Court properly

granted the owners' Motion to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to
the Evidence as to attorney's fees, 7 6 pursuant to the second part
of Rule 15(b), which provides as follows:
74

3 Moore's Federal Practice, (2d Ed.), Sec. 15.13[2],
p. 989-991.

75

Id. at p. 991.

76

R.539 (Paragraphs 7 and 8 ) , and 546 (Paragraph 3 ) .
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. . . If evidence is objected to at the trial
on the ground that it is not within the issues
made by the pleadings, the Court may allow the
pleadings to be amended when the presentation
of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the objecting party fails to
satisfy the court that the admission of such
evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The
court shall grant a continuance, if necessary,
to enable the objecting party to meet such
evidence.
The tenants to do not even argue that they were prejudice in
maintaining their defense against the owners7 claim for attorney's
fees by the admission of evidence pertaining thereto.

In fact,

the tenants admit that "the issue of attorney's fees was not new
at trial, but raised in owners' Motion for Summary Judgment and
objected to at that time based upon improper pleading."77

Tenants

were put on notice sixteen months prior to trial that attorney's
fees were an issue.
No cross-claim against the tenants for attorney's fees was
included in the owners' Answer to Complaint because that Answer
was filed before it was known that the tenants would assert a
claim.

The owners' Answer was filed approximately August 6, 1985,

and the Trial Court found in its Order of Immediate Occupancy
entered August 16, 1985, that the "tenants have no right or claim
to

the

proceeds

compensation."

to

be

awarded

in

this

action

as

just

It was not until the tenants filed their Answer on

Brief of Appellants, p. 18.

or about August 22, 1985, that the owners learned
claim.

The tenants were then immediately put on notice that the

owners were
their

of tenants'

seeking

Motion

for

attorney's

Summary

fees, because

Judgment

asking

the owners

that

filed

attorney's

fees

might be awarded against the tenants arising out of their claim.
The Motion was served on the 16th day of October, 1985.

It was

the tenants who asked the Court to set the matter for trial on
February
their

10, 1987, as to those issues raised by the owners in

Motion

for

Judgment, 78

Summary

giving

them

some

months to prepare as to the issue of attorney's fees.
then

set

the matter

as

to

the

amount

of

sixteen

The Court

attorney's

fees

for

another hearing held March 25, 1987.

The tenants were served on

March

Affidavit

15,

1987,

with

the

owners'

in

Support

of

Attorney's Fees From Tenants, which Affidavit was admitted into
evidence at the hearing on March 25, 1987. 7 9

At that hearing, the

tenants asked for a further evidentiary hearing as to the amount
of fees and to cross-examine the owners' attorney on this issue. 80
Additional

Affidavits

were

submitted

by

the

owners 8 1

and

the

tenants 82 and further evidentiary hearing was conducted on May 28,
78

R.533.

79

R.768.

80

R.810.

81

R.502-506.

82

R.524-527.
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1987.

The matter was submitted on those Affidavits without any

further introduction of evidence nor cross-examination on the part
of the tenants' attorney.

At that time, the Court determined that

attorney's fees in the sum of $9,000.00 was reasonable and entered
a judgment to that effect. 83
It certainly cannot be said that the tenants did not have
sufficient

notice

to

enable

them

to meet

the

evidence

as

to

attorney's fees or were otherwise prejudiced by the owners' claim.
The Trial Court properly exercised

its discretion to amend the

pleadings to conform to the evidence and this appeal should not be
resolved upon any alleged procedural defects, but upon the merits
of

the

case

requiring

an

interpretation

of

the written

Lease

Agreements between the parties. 84
Lastly,
insufficient

the
on

tenants
its face

argue

that the owners' "Affidavit

for the award of attorney's

is

fees." 85

R.542, 547.
"The Court may permit the pleadings to be amended in its
discretion, and amendment is to be freely allowed in
order to aid in the presentation of the merits of the
controversy, if the opposing party is not actually
prejudice. The party opposing the amendment should not
succeed by arguing a technical change in the 'cause of
action' or 'defense,' since that merely means 'legal'
and not 'actual' surprise. He must show that he would
be prejudice in maintaining his action or defense on the
merits by the admission of the evidence." 3 Moore's
Federal Practice, (2d Ed.), Section 15.14, p. 15-137
(1985).
Brief of Appellants, p. 18.
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There

were

two

Affidavits

in

Support

of Attorney's

Tenants 86 upon which the Court based its ruling.

Fees

From

The first was

admitted into evidence by Stipulation at the hearing on March 25,
1987, on the owners' Motion for Attorney's Fees. 8 7
Supplemental

Affidavit

in

Support

of

The owners'

Attorney's

Fees

From

Tenants 88 was submitted on April 6, 1987.
The Affidavits before the Court are specific to the effect
that 133 hours in attorney's time was necessarily incurred solely
as a result of the actions taken by the tenants and not for any
other work

incurred

in connection with this condemnation.

The

Affidavit sets forth a breakdown as to what work was performed
during

those

various

hours,

that

the

hours

were

"necessarily

incurred," 89 and great detail was given as to why it was necessary
to incur that time.
to

state

his

The Affidavit qualifies the owners' attorney

opinion

that

"$100.00

per

hour

represents

the

prevailing market rate" for similar legal services in the area, 9 0
and the Affidavit goes into nine pages of detail explaining the
novelty, difficulty and nature of the issues that were involved
requiring

research,

86

R.456-466.

87

R.768.

88

R.502-506.

89

Paragraph 2.

90

Paragraph 9.

analysis

and

38

drafting

for

nine

separate

pleadings comprising 56 pages, plus preparation and attendance at
five separate Court hearings, including the trial on the issue of
the tenants7 rights and the hearing on May 28, 1987.
The
pleadings

Trial
of

Court

the

can

amount

also

take

involved

judicial

and

results

notice

from

obtained,

the

which

reveal that the tenants were seeking in excess of $273,000,00 for
their leasehold interests 91 resulting in no award.

Not only was

there sufficient evidence for the Trial Court to base its award of
attorney's fees, but it is submitted that it is more likely that
the Trial Court erred in not awarding more than the $9,000.00.
POINT III
THE OWNERS SHOULD BE AWARDED COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES NECESSARILY INCURRED
IN DEFENDING AGAINST THIS APPEAL
Inasmuch as an award of attorney's fees is required by the
provisions of the Leases, the owners seek to have this Court grant
further attorney's fees necessarily incurred in defending against
this appeal and to remand this case to the District Court for its
determination

of

reasonable

attorney's

fees

and

costs

to

granted to the owners arising out of the appeal of this case. 9 2

R.247 (Paragraph 11).
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates,
617 P.2d 406 (Utah, 1980).
39

be

CONCLUSION
The tenants had a full and fair trial as to the issue of
whether they held any bonus value under their Leases and the Trial
Court properly found that the condemnation clause contained in the
Leases precluded the tenants from sharing

in any award

to the

owners of just compensation, especially in view of the fact that
the taking was of the total tract and an election of termination
was

made

by

one

or both

parties

requirements of the Leases.

in full

compliance

with

the

Also, the issue as to attorney's fees

was properly before the Trial Court and the evidence before the
Court fully supported the Court's award.
the

Trial

Court's

Order

and

Judgment

This Court shouLd affirm
and

Order

on

Post-Trial

Motions and other findings as they affect the interests of the
tenants in these proceedings denying the tenants any bonus value
under the Leases and awarding $9,000.00 in attorney's fees and to
remand

this

case

to

the

District

Court

with

instructions

to

determine a reasonable attorney's fee to be awarded the owners for
i

the appeal of this case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

O / " day of March, 1988.

DART, ADAMSON & KASTING

BY-///////

>(,iaa;)

JOHN^T. EVANS

7

orneys for Defendants/Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondents, Burge, Barrows and Barrows were
faaftd"delivered to the following named persons this
March, 1988•
Brant Wall, Esq.
WALL & WALL
Boston Building #800
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84111
Harold A. Hintze, Esq.
OLSEN, HINTZE, NIELSON & HILL
3319 No. University Ave. #200
Provo, Ut. 84604
William D. Oswald, Esq.
57 West 200 South #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
B. Ray Zoll, Esq.
5251 South Green Street #205
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Jerome H. Mooney, III, Esq.
Kyle Treadway, Esq.
236 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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day of

ADDENDUM

43

LEASE

THIS INEENTUKE OF LEASE made and entered into as
of the

1st

day of

August

19

81

, by and

between BEATRICE BARRCWS, ROBERT G. BARROWS, AND JUNE SURGE, a l l
individuals of Salt Lake City, Utah, hereinafter referred to as
"L£SSOR," and

Terry Pantelakis dba

AAA Jewelry & Loans

9

hereinafter referred to as

"LESSEE;"
WITNESSETH :

That in consideration of the rental, covenants and
agreements herein reserved and contained on the part of the
Lessee to be paid, performed and observed, Lessor does hereby
lease, demise and l e t unto Lessee, and Lessee does hereby hire
and take from Lessor, the premises known and described as:
64 East 2nd South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

10 HAVE AND TO HOLD said premises for a period of
Five
19

(5) years beginning the

1st

day of

81 .
Lessee shall pay Lessor the sun of $

payable at the r a t e of $

400.00

1st

period of

(fift\ Tiaaths, aacmservcir^

81 .

Sixty

4,800.00

p ^ month, monthly in

advance, on the

19

August

day of each and every month for a
August 1

_.

- 2 Notices, payments and other conmunications herein
provided or hereby contenplated shall be considered duly delivered
when mailed by either registered

or ordinary first-class mail,

postage prepaid, to Lessor at 777 Barrows Avenue, Salt Lake City.
Utah, and to Lessee at
City, Utah 84111

66 East and Second South, Salt Lake
#

This Lease shall not be assigned, and neither said
premises nor any part thereof shall be let or underlet, nor used
nor permitted to be used for other than retail store or office
or warehouse purposes, without the written consent of Lessor or
its successors or assigns first endorsed hereon, which such
consent, shall not be unreasonably withheld, and if so assigned,
let, underlet, used or permitted to be used without such written
consent, Lessor may re-enter and re-let said premises and this
Lease by such act shall be terminated as Lessor shall so determine and elect.

Should Lessee sublet the whole or any part of

said premises, or permit any other person than above, jointly
with Lessee or otherwise, to occupy said premises or any part
thereof without such written consent, neither acceptance of rent
by Lessor from Lessee or any other person thereafter, nor failure
on the part of Lessor for any particular period to take action
on account of such breach or to enforce its rights, shall be
desred

a waiver of the breach, but the same shall be a continuing

breach so long as such subtenancy or occupancy contin\jes.

It is hereby agreed that all property of any kind
placed in or on said premises shall be so placed at the sole risk
of Lessee and those claiming through or under Lessee.

Lessor

shall not be liable for any loss of property by theft or burglary
from said premises or the said building, or accidental damage

- 3 to person or property in or about said premises or such building
resulting from electric lighting, wiring, rain, snow, steam or
gas, unless caused by

or due to negligence of Lessor, its agents,

servants or employees.

Lessor shall remedy defects in or damages

to said premises with reasonable diligence following awareness by
Lessor that such defects or damages exist.
Lessee shall comply with all municipal, state, federal
or other applicable laws and regulations respecting Lessee's use
of said premises.
It is further mutually agreed that if forty percent
(ttTL) of said premises shall be destroyed by fire or other unavoidable
casualty after the execution and before the termination hereof,
this Lease shall terminate at the election of Lessor upon
written notice to Lessee by Lessor; provided, however, that
Lessee may terminate this Lease by written notice given Lessor
within thirty (30) days following the occurrence of damage so caused,
if within such period Lessor has not provided for substantial restoration of said premises by a date no later than ninety-one (91) days
following the date the damage occurred.

If this Lease is not so

terminated, then in case of any such destruction of or damage to
said premises, a just proportion of the rent hereinbefore reserved
according to the nature and extent of the damage sustained to
said premises shall be suspended or abated until said premises shall
have been put in proper condition for use and occupation.

No

compensation to or claim therefore by Lessee shall be made by reason
of inconvenience or annoyance arising from necessity of repairing
any portion of said premises or the said building however such
necessity may occur.

- A In the event said premises,""or any part thereof, or
the vhole or any part of the said building shall be taken by right
of-eminent domain or shall be "taken for any street or public use
or the action of public authorities after the execution and before
the termination hereof, this Lease may, at the election of Lessor
or Lessee, be terminated; provided, however, in such event, Lessee
shall" be-entitled to..compensation for improvements made to said
premisesT-in-an-amount equal-to the compensation received by lessor
in-respect-thereof and as a* result thereof, regardless of the termination of this Lease.
Entry in and upon said premises hereunder by Lessee
shall constitute acceptance of said premises by Lessee and
acknowledgment thereby that said premises are in good and satisfactory condition when possession is so taken and in the condition
in which said premises where represented to be or agreed to be
placed by Lessor.

Lessee shall care for said premises and cure

any and all damage thereto effected by Lessee or Lessee's agents,
clerks, servants and visitors, and shall quit and surrender said
premises upon termination hereof in as good condition as reasonable
use thereof will permit.

Lessee shall make no alterations or

improvements of or additions to said premises without the prior
written consent of Lessor, except the improvements and additions
now being provided by Lessee; all alterations or improvements of
or additions to said premises made by either party hereto, excluding
movable furniture and detachable trade fixtures placed in said
premises by and at the expense of Lessee, shall be the property of
Lessor and shall remain upon and be surrendered with said premises
as a part thereof, at the termination of this Lease.

- 5 I t i s hereby agreed that i f Lessee shall default in
unking any or a l l rental payments, keeping any or a l l t e r e s , conditions or covenants of t h i s Lease, abandon said premises, b e c c w
bankrupt or make an assignment for the b e n e f i t of creditors, then
and in any of said cases, Lessor may, a f t e r f i v e (5) days, written
notice allowing Lessee t o cure any such d e f a u l t , re-enter upon
said premises and, a t Lessor's option, annul and make void t h i s
Lease as to a l l future rights of Lessee, anything herein to the
contrary notwithstanding.

Lessee covenants and agrees that in

case of termination accomplished pursuant to provisions of t h i s
paragraph, Lessee w i l l indemnify Lessor against a l l l o s s of rents
or other payments which, but for such termination, Lessor would
have been e n t i t l e d to receive under the terms and provisions of
t h i s Lease, and a l s o against a l l attorney's fees and expenses i n curred by Lessor i n enforcing any of the terms and provisions of
this Lease.
No-holding-over by Lessee,-however--long-continued,
s h a l l operate to r e n e w o r e x t e n d ' t h i s Lease without Lessor's
written.'Consent.

I f Lessee halds possession of s a i d premises

a f t e r the term of t h i s Lease or any renewal term thereof, Lessee
s h a l l become a tenant from month to month, a t the rent payable i n
the l a s t installment during the l a s t month o f the term of t h i s
Lease, and upon the terms herein s p e c i f i e d , and s h a l l continue t o
be such tenant u n t i l the tenancy s h a l l be terminated by Lessor
or u n t i l Lessee s h a l l have given Lessor a written n o t i c e of at
l e a s t one (1) month of L e s s e e ' s i n t e n t i o n to terminate the tenancy.
Lessor s h a l l furnish such heating as may be required
to maintain s a i d premises i n a comfortable and healthful condition

- 6 Lessee shall be obligated to pay all gas and heating bills, and
Lessee shall also pay all pluibing bills and electric light
charges.

Lessee also agrees to pay all costs and attorney's fees

and expenses that shall arise fran enforcing the terms and provisions of this Lease.
Lessee agrees to keep all glass, including plate
window glass upon said premises.

In the event of any breakage.

Lessee shall not hold Lessor responsible for the replacement of
same.
Lessee agrees to save Lessor harmless from any
liability by reason of personal injury to any person or property
on or about said premises, and to carry indemnity insurance against
said liability in a sun of not less than $100,000/$300,000, a copy
of which insurance policy shall be given to Lessor upon execution
of this Lease Agreement.
Lessee agrees to pay any increase, as additional
yearly rent, in and above the real properry taxes assessed

on

said premises by the Salt Lake County Assessor for the year

^ 98 ~

Said additional taxes, if any, shall be due first for the year
^-986

t an^

thereafter during the term of this Lease.
It is understood and agreed that the covenants and

agreements hereof shall inure to and be binding upcn the heirs,
legal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties
hereto.
In the event, however, that, at any time during the
term hereof, Lessor shall receive fran any third party a bona fide
offer to purchase the premises at a price and on terms acaeptable
to Lessor, Lessor shall give written notice of such price and
terms to Lessee and Lessee shall have thirty (30) days thereafter

- 7 in which to execute a written agreement with Lessor for the
purchase of the premises at such price and on such terns.

If

Lessor shall so notify Lessee and Lessee shall fail to execute
such agreement within such thirty (30) day period, Lessor shall
thereafter be free to sell the property to a third party making
the offer on the same terms.and condiditons set forth in such
offer, and if the property is so sold to such party, then all
rights of Lessee under this section shall forthwith terminate.
Nothing herein contained shall in any way limit
the right of Lessor to transfer or convey the premises on the
dissolution of Lessor's interests as herein stated, for nominal
or no consideration, and Lessee shall have no rigfrt to purchase
the property in the event of such transfer or conveyance.
Lessee shall keep all of the premises and every part
thereof and all buildings and other improvements at any time
located thereon free and clear of any and all mechanics, materialmens, and other liens for or arising our of or in connection with
work or labor done, services performed, or materials or appliances
used or furnished for or in connection with any operations of
Lessee, any alteration, improvement or repairs or additions which
Lessee may make or permit or cause to be made, or any work or
construction by, for, or permitted by Lessee on or about the
premises, or any obligations of any kind incurred by Lessee, and
at all times promptly and fully to pay and discharge any and all
claims on which any such lien may or could be based, and to
indemnify Lessor and all of the premises and all buildings and
improvements thereon against all such liens and claims of liens or
suits, or other proceedings pertaining thereto.

Lessee shall give

- 8 Lessor written notice no less than ten (10) days in advance
of the conmencement of any construction, alterations, addition,
improvement or repair estimated to cost in excess

of $ 1,000.00

in order that Lessor may post appropriate notices of Lessor*s
non-responsibility.
If Lessee desires to contest any such lien, it shall
notify Lessor of its intention to do so within five (5). days
after the filing of such lien.

In such case, and provided that

Lessee shall, on demand, protect Lessor by good and sufficient
surety bond against any such lien and any cost, liability, or
damage arising out of such contest. Lessee shall not be in default hereunder until ten (10) days after the final determination
of the validity thereof, within which time Lessee shall satisfy
and discharge such lien to the extent held valid; but the
satisfaction of discharge of any such lien shall not, in any
case, be delayed until the execution is had on any judgment rendered
thereon, and such delay shall be a default of Lessee hereunder.
In the event of any such contest, Lessee shall protect and indemnify Lessor against all loss, expense and damage resulting
therefrom, including reasonable attorney's fees.
Lessor grants to Lessee an option to- renew this
Lease for-a period of • Five

(5) years* afteirxhe" expiration of

the term of this Lease at a rental to be negotiated at least
sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of this Lease, with all
other terms and conditions of the renewal lease to be the ssns
those herein.

as

To exercise this option, Lessee must give Lessor

written notice of intention to extend at least ninety (90) days
before this lease expires.

9 IN WITNESS VHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed
this Indenture as of the date fixst above sec forth.

LESSOR:

3^ A

M

/M/UWf
Z:

C/

~-<f...

t

tUrt^

i*"»t i^r\rjc #c»±

'

^

(Including Title)

LEA S E

THIS INEOTTURE OF LEASE rrade and entered i n t o as
of the

1st

day of

August

, 19

31

by and

becween BEATRICE BARRCWS, R03ERT G. BARROWS. AND JUNE BURG, a i l
i n d i v i d u a l s of S a l t Lake City, Utah, h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as
"LESSOR," and

Ellen K. Daskalas dba

Ihe Pawn Shop

, h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as

"LESSEE;"
WITNESSETH

:

That in c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the r e n t a l , covenants and
agreements herein reserved and contained on the p a r t of the
Lessee to be paid, performed and observed, Lessor does hereby
l e a s e , demise and l e t unto Lessee, and Lessee does hereby h i r e
and take from Lessor, the premises known and described a s :

66 East 2nd South
S a l t Lake City, Utah 84111

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD s a i d premises for a period of
Five
19

81

(5) years beginning the

1st

payable a t che race of $
advance, on the
period of
81

August

.
Lessee s h a l l pay Lessor the sum of $

19

day of

.

Sixty

1st

450.00

5,400.00

p e r month, monthly in

day of each and every month for a

(60) months, commencing

August 1

,

- 2 Notices, payments and other cormuni cat ions herein
provided or hereby contemplated shall be considered duly delivered
when mailed by either registered

or ordinary first-class mail,

postage prepaid, to Lessor at 777 Barrows Avenue, Salt Lake City,
Utah, and to Lessee at
City, Utah 84111

66 East and Second South, Salt Lake
#

This Lease shall not be assigned, and neither said
premises nor any part thereof shall be let or underlet, nor used
nor permitted to be used for other than retail store or office
or warehouse purposes, without the written consent of Lessor or
its successors or assigns first endorsed hereon, which such
consent, shall not be unreasonably withheld, and if so assigned,
let, underlet, used or permitted to be used without such written
consent, Lessor may re-enter and re-let said premises and :his
Lease by such act shall be terminated as Lessor shall so determine and elect.

Should Lessee sublet the whole or any par: of

said premises, or permit any other person than above, jointly
with Lessee or otherwise, to occupy said premises or any part
thereof without such written consent, neither acceptance oE rent
by Lessor from Lessee or any other person thereafter, nor failure
on the part of Lessor for any particular period to take action
on account of such breach or to enforce its rights, shall be
deemed a waiver of the breach, bur the same shall be a continuing
breach so long as such subtenancy or occupancy continues.
It is hereby agreed that all property of any kind
placed in or on said premises shall be so placed at the sole risk
of Lessee and those claiming through or under Lessee.

Lessor

shall not be liable for any loss of property by theft or burglary
from said premises or the said building, or accidental damage

- 3 to person or property in or about said premises or such building
resulting frcm electric lighting, wiring, rain, snow, steam or
gas, unless caused by

or due to negligence of Lessor, its agents,

servants or employees.

Lessor shall remedy defects in or damages

to said premises with reasonable diligence following awareness by
Lessor that such defects or damages exist.
Lessee shall comply with all municipal, state, federal
or other applicable laws and regulations respecting Lessee's use
of said premises.
It is further mutually agreed that if forty percent
(407.) of said premises shall be destroyed by fire or other unavoidable
casualty after the execution and before the termination hereof,
this Lease shall terminate at the election of Lessor upon
written notice to Lessee by Lessor; provided, however, that
Lessee may terminate this Lease by written notice given Lessor
within thirty (30) days following the occurrence of damage so caused,
if within such period Lessor has not provided for substantial restoration of said premises by a date no later than ninety-cne (91) days
following the date the damage occurred.

If this Lease is not so

terminated, then in case of any such destruction of or damage to
said premises, a just proportion of the rent hereinbefore reserved
according to the nature and extent of the damage sustained to
said premises shall be suspended or abated until said premises shall
have been put in proper condition for use and occupation.

No

compensation to or claim therefore by Lessee shall be made by reason
of inconvenience or annoyance arising from necessity of repairing
any portion of said premises or the said building however such
necessity may occur.

- 4 In the event said premises, or any part thereof, or
the fehole or any part of the said building shall be taken by right
of eminent domain or shall be taken for any street or public use
or the action of public authorities after the execution arid before
the termination hereof, this Lease may, at the election of Lessor
or Lessee, be terminated; provided, however, in such event, Lessee
shall be entitled to compensation for improvements made to said
premises, in an amount equal to the compensation received by Lessor
in respect thereof and as a result thereof, regardless of the termination of this Lease.
Entry in and upon said premises hereunder by Lessee
shall constitute acceptance of said premises by Lessee and
acknowledgment thereby that said premises are in good and satisfactory condition when possession is so taken and in the condition
in which said premises where represented to be or agreed to be
placed by Lessor.

Lessee shall care for said premises and cure

any and all damage thereto effected by Lessee or Lessee's agents,
clerks, servants and visitors, and shall quit and surrenderr said
premises upon termination hereof in as good condition as reasonable
use thereof will permit.

Lessee shall make no alterations or

improvements of or additions to said premises without the prior
written consent of Lessor, except the improvements and additions
now being provided by Lessee; all alterations or improvements of
or additions to said premises made by either party hereto, excluding
movable furniture and detachable trade fixtures placed in said
premises by and at the expense of Lessee, shall be the property of
Lessor and shall remain upon and be surrendered with said premises
as a part thereof, at the termination of this Lease.
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I t i s hereby agreed that if Lessee shall default in
making any or a l l rental payments, keeping any or a l l terms, conditions or covenants of this Lease, abandon said premises, become
bankrupt or make an assignment for the benefit of creditors, then
and in any of said cases, Lessor may, after five (5) days, written
notice allowing Lessee to cure any such default, re-enter upon
said premises and, at Lessor's option, annul and make void this
Lease as to a l l future rights of Lessee, anything herein to the
contrary notwithstanding.

Lessee covenants and agrees that in

case of termination accomplished pursuant to provisions of this
paragraph, Lessee w i l l inderinify Lessor against a l l loss of rents
or other payments which, but for such termination, Lessor w u l d
have been entitled to receive under the terms and provisions of
this Lease, and also against a l l attorney's fees and expenses incurred by Lessor in enforcing any of the terms and provisions of
this Lease.
No holding over by Lessee, however long continued,
shall operate to renew or extend this Lease without Lessor's
written consent.

If Lessee holds possession of said premises

after the term of this Lease or any renewal term thereof, Lessee
shall become a tenant from month to month, at the rent payable in
the l a s t installment during the l a s t month of the term of this
Lease, and upon the terms herein specified, and shall continue to
be such tenant u n t i l the tenancy shall be terminated by Lessor
or u n t i l Lessee shall have given Lessor a written notice of at
least one (1) month of Lessee's intention to terminate the tenancy.
Lessor s h a l l furnish such heating as may be required
to maintain said premises in a comfortable and healthful condition

- 6 Lessee shall be obligated to pay all gas and heating bills, and
Lessee shall also pay all plurbing bills and electric light
charges. Lessee also agrees to pay all costs and attorney's fees
and expenses that shall arise from enforcing the teres and provisions of this Lease.
Lessee agrees to keep all glass, including place
window glass upon said premises.

In the event of any breakage,

Lessee shall not hold Lessor responsible for the replacement of
same.

Lessee agrees to save Lessor harmless from any
liability by reason of personal injury to any person or property
on or about said premises, and to carry indemnity insurance against
said liability in a sun of not less than $100,000/$300,000, a copy
of which insurance policy shall be given to Lessor upon execution
of this Lease Agreement.
Lessee agrees to pay any increase, as additional
yearly rent, in and shave

the real property taxes assessed on

said premises by the Salt Lake County Assessor for the year

1981

Said additional taxes, if any, shall be due first for the year
^986

t

and thereafter during the term of this Lease.
It is understood and agreed that the covenants and

agreements hereof shall inure to and be binding upon the heirs,
legal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties
hereto.
In the event, however, that, at any time during the
term hereof, Lessor shall receive from any third party a bona fide
offer to purchase the premises at a price and on terms acceptable
to Lessor, Lessor shall give written notice of such price and
terms to Lessee and Lessee shall have thirty (30) days thereafter

- 7 in which to execute a written agreement with Lessor for the
purchase of the premises at such price and on such terms.

If

Lessor shall so notify Lessee and Lessee shall fail to execute
such agreement within such thirty (30) day period, Lessor shall
thereafter be free to sell the property to a third parry making
the offer on the same terms and condiditons set forth in such
offer, and if the property is so sold to such party, then all
rights of Lessee under this section shall forthwith terminate.
Nothing herein contained shall in any way limit
the right of Lessor to transfer or convey the premises on the
dissolution of Lessor's interests as herein stated, for nominal
or no consideration, and Lessee shall have no right to purchase
the property in the event of such transfer or conveyance.
Lessee shall keep all of the premises and every part
thereof and all buildings and other improvements at any tine
located thereon free and clear of any and all mechanics, materialmens, and other liens for or arising out of or in connection with
work or labor done, services performed, or materials or appliances
used or furnished for or in connection with any operations of
Lessee, any alteration, improvement or repairs or additions which
Lessee may make or permit or cause to be made, or any work or
construction by, for, or permitted by Lessee on or about the
premises, or any obligations of any kind incurred by Lessee, and
at all times promptly and fully to pay and discharge any and all
claims on which any such lien may or could be based, and to
indemnify Lessor and all of the premises and all buildings and
improvements thereon against all such liens and claims of liens or
suits, or other proceedings pertaining thereto.

Lessee shall give

- 8 Lessor written notice no less than ten (10) days in advance
of the commencement of any construction, alterations, addition,
improvement or repair estimated to cost in excess of $ 1.C00.0Q
in order that Lessor may post appropriate notices of Lessor's
non-responsibility.
If Lessee desires to contest any such lien, it shall
notify Lessor of its intention to do so within five (5) days
after the filing of such lien.

In such case, and provided that

Lessee shall, on demand, protect Lessor by good and sufficient
surety bond against any such lien and any cost, liability, or
damage arising out of such contest, Lessee shall not be in default hereunder until ten (10) days after the final deternirLation
of the validity thereof, within which time Lessee shall satisfy
and discharge such lien to the extent held valid; but the
satisfaction of discharge of any such lien shall not, in any
case, be delayed until the execution is had on any judgment rendered
thereon, and such delay shall be a default of Lessee hereunder.
In the event of any such contest, Lessee shall protect and indemnify Lessor against all loss, expense and damage resulting
therefrom, including reasonable attorney's fees.
Lessor grants to Lessee an option to renew this
Lease for a period of

Five

(5) years after the expiration of

the term of this Lease at a rental to be negotiated at least
sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of this Lease, with all
other terms and conditions of the renewal lease to be the same as
those herein.

To exercise this option, Lessee must give Lessor

written notice of intention to extend at least ninety (90) days
before this lease expires.

- 9IN WITNESS VHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed
this Indenture as of the date first above set forth.

LESSEE:

LESSOR:

THE PAWN SHOP

0\,'~*<S *z^^

%

.-ET(Including Title)

ATTEST:

C<.^
(Including Title) •j^ ~ o 3 - SJ--

n ^

J O H N T.

EVANS

A T T O R N E Y AT LAW
3 I O SOUTH M A I N . SUITE 1 3 3 0

SALT LAICE CITY, UTAH 84101

T4ufiJwofliaiqp'> 2?i-<£&87

Jerome H. Mooney
Mooney & Smith
236 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re: Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake vs* Barrows et. al.
Dear Jerry,
Enclosed find a copy for your records of the owners' Election
of Termination in the above action/ which I have prepared because
of your assertion that one or more of your clients are still
claiming a leasehold interest in the subject property as a result
of a renewal you allege took place. You will recall that we
discussed this by telephone on November 11, 1986. At that time I
indicated to you that the Barrrows had not received notice from
any lessee of intent to extend any Lease as required by its
provisions, and you stated you would furnish me copies of
such notices. When they did not arrive I contacted your office
again in December and mentioned it again to Brant Wall in
January when we spoke, but to date have still been furnished no
evidence that any extensions were requested.
As I told you it remains our position that any
Leases were terminated with the filing by the RDA of this action
in condemnation as argued by our Motion for Summary Judgment
filed soon after commencement of the case, and that the tenants
have remained in possession only under a month to month tenancy.
In that light it would certainly be presumptuous to think that by
allowing the tenants to remain in possession the owners in any
way were acquiescing to the fact that the tenants were doing so
under a new five year lease for the same rent as was paid during
the prior five years, even though there was no negotiation or
agreement thereto. Obviously, were any such Lease to be renewed
it would not be for less that the full economic rent which the
properties could bear.
You also indicated you would send me an itemization of what
improvements your tenants are claiming they should be compensated
for, which I have not yet received. Without the above
information it is impossible to discuss with you your clients
claims, and I would appreciate receiving this as soon as
possible. In the meantime, please do not misconstrue your
clients' continued possession of the premises as acquiescence by
the Barrows that there has been renewal of any prior Lease.

EXHIBIT

C

Jerome H. Mooney
February 2, 1987
Page 2
I will look forward to hearing from either you or Brant
Very truly yours,

JohA T. Evans, P.C.
enclo
cc: Brant Wall

John T. Evans (#1013)
Attorney for Defendants
310 So. Main Street #1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 521-6383
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo—
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT
LAKE CITY, a public entity,

ELECTION OF TERMINATION

Plaintiff,
VS.

Civil No. C85-4017
JUNIATA IRENE BURGE, ROBERT
D. BARROWS, JR., BEATRICE IRENE
BARROWS, et al.,

JUDGE: Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.
—ooOoo—
TO THE DEFENDANTS ELLEN K. DASKALAS, THE PAWN SHOP, JAMES
ANDERSON, TERRY PANTELAKIS, LOANS AND SALES, INC.,
LEO VAN KOHMAN (HEREINAFTER "LESSEES") AND THEIR ATTORNEYS:
Please take notice that due to the commencement by Plaintiff
of the above entitled action in Eminent Domain to condemn the
properties which are the subject hereof located respectively at
#62, 64, and 66 East 200 South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, as
more particularly described in the Complaint on file herein, and
which are or have been occupied by the above named Lessees, the
defendants JUNIATA IRENE BURGE, aka June Burge, and ROBERT D.
BARROWS, JR.,aka Robert G. Barrows, and BEATRICE IRENE BARROWS
(hereinafter "owners"), owners and Lessors of such premises,
hereby elect to terminate, effective immediately,

any and all

Leases, if any, under which such Lessees may claim a right to
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possession

of such premises or to any proceeds arising out of the

conveyance thereof/ whether pursuant to eminent domain or
otherwise-

Any such Lessees are hereby tenants from month to

month and shall continue as such until such tenancy shall be
terminated o
Such election in no way constitutes an admission by the
Owners that any such Leases are in effect nor that they have any
duty to make such election/ nor that the Lessees would otherwise
have any right to the occupancy of the premises nor to any
proceeds arising out of the conveyance thereof/ which matters are
hereby specifically denied by owners.
Dated this 31st day of January/ 1987.

c\Lr&
n

J o h n flr. Evans

u

<-' a a-?

Attorney
for Defendant-Owners
tor

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ELECTION OF TERMINATION
on this I*

was mailed

day of February, 1987, postage prepaid to the

following:
Loans & Sales, Inc.
Leo Van Komen
62 East 200 South St.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Terry Pantelakis
dba AAA Jewelry & Loans
66 East 200 South St.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Ellen K. Daskalas
dba The Pawn Shop
66 East 200 South St.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Terry Pantelakis
dba AAA Jewelry & Loans
64 East 200 South St.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
James Anderson
dba Jim's Place
62% East 200 South St
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Harold A. Hintze
Attorney at Law
3319 No. University Ave.
Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
William D. Oswald
Fox, Edwards, Gardiner & Brown
57 West 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Jerome H. Mooney
Mooney & Smith
236 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Brant Wall
Attorney-at-Law
800 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
B. Ray Zoll
Attorney at Law
5251 South Green St. #205
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
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